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I. IN LOVE WITH STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
We begin with true banalities: most Americans—and, for that matter, 
perhaps even most foreigners as well—are aware that there is something called 
the United States Constitution. It is also the case that most Americans—though 
here there is increasing reason to believe that this is not true of most people 
around the world2—approve of the Constitution, perhaps “venerate” or even 
“love” it.3 That has often been asserted, particularly by Levinson in his book 
Constitutional Faith,4 but the evidence was necessarily impressionistic.5 
                                                                                                                     
 1 Originally prepared for the Symposium at The Ohio State University Moritz 
College of Law on state constitutionalism. We are both extremely grateful to the various 
members of the Ohio State Law Journal (and to Judge Jeffrey Sutton) for the extraordinary 
hospitality shown to us on that occasion. 
  W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Centennial Chair in Law, 
University of Texas Law School; Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin. 
 † Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Maryland, Baltimore County. 
 2 See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States 
Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 762 (2012). 
 3 See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Mila Versteeg, The Contours of Constitutional 
Approval 1 (Aug. 18, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id 
=2646773 [https://perma.cc/SN77-PBJM]. 
 4 See generally SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988) (discussing a 
person’s devotion to the Constitution as the center of one’s political life). 
 5 See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, Our Broken Constitution, NEW YORKER (Dec. 9, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/12/09/our-broken-constitution [https://perma.cc/ 
A2J7-LG8J] (noting that both sides of the political spectrum “love” the Constitution, a fact 
that may be the “single point of consensus in this heated political moment”).  
212 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77:2 
Fortunately, professors Stephanopoulos and Versteeg have analyzed a recent 
national poll to provide interesting empirical evidence of what has been 
asserted.6 Thus, the poll demonstrates that “Americans strongly back their 
federal Constitution.”7 The average approval score by recipients, out of a 
possible 10, was 7.8; more impressive, at least from one perspective, is the fact 
that “its median score is even higher at 9.”8 Indeed, a full 20% of the 
respondents gave the Constitution the maximum score of ten, while only one-
in-twenty Americans rated it at level five or below.9 Levinson notes that in 
spite of his work asserting the important presence of “constitutional 
veneration” as part of American political culture, he himself distinctly 
disapproves of the U.S. Constitution and would probably give it a rating of 
somewhere between three and four.10  
Still, there is other empirical data that at least suggests the possibility that 
we, in fact, overestimate the degree of veneration among the public in 
general.11 During the Bicentennial period surrounding 1987, a variety of polls 
were taken that indicate at least a measure of public ambivalence.12 Thus, 
when a Newsweek/Gallup poll in May asked 812 Americans “Do you believe 
that after 200 years the Constitution is still basically sound and meets the 
needs of our country, or do you think the Constitution is in need of some basic 
changes or amendments?” only 53% answered “basically sound,” while the 
remainder declared that it needed changes or amendment; interestingly 
enough, the poll did not indicate that any of their respondents had “no 
opinion” or were otherwise indifferent.13 An ABC News/Washington Post poll 
a month earlier asked 1,509 respondents if they believed that it “is a good idea 
or a bad idea” to have “a Constitutional convention to change the U.S. 
Constitution.”14 While 71% declared that it was a bad idea, it may be at least 
                                                                                                                     
 6 See Stephanopoulos & Versteeg, supra note 3, at 15–20. 
 7 Id. at 20. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Indeed, Levinson wrote a book detailing some of his disapproval with the U.S. 
Constitution. See generally SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 
(2006) (asserting that the American Constitution includes too many provisions that lead to 
an unjust and ineffective government). 
 11 See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Constitution and Presidential Leadership,  
47 MD. L. REV. 54, 54 (1987) (recounting recent polling and noting that many Americans 
have only “the dimmest idea what is in [the Constitution]”); see also Gerard J.  
Fitzpatrick, Constitution Deserves Continuing Scrutiny, PHILLY.COM (Sept. 17, 1987), 
http://articles.philly.com/1987-09-17/news/26210305_1_constitution-sacred-document-
bicentennial [https://perma.cc/X6BC-S5L5] (summarizing the results of a “national poll” 
on the constitution, which suggests the populace did not understand the document and 
characterizing Americans as being “complacent” towards the document). 
 12 See supra note 11.  
 13 Gallup/Newsweek Poll, Question No. 8 (May 1987) (poll data available at 
http://ropercenter.cornell.edu/ipoll-database, Dataset No. USAIPOSPGONEW1987-87120). 
 14 ABC/Washington Post Poll, Question 1 (Apr. 1987) (poll data available at 
http://ropercenter.cornell.edu/ipoll-database, Dataset No. USABCWASH1987-7021). 
2016] WHEN AMERICANS THINK ABOUT CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 213 
noteworthy that 24% responded that it was a good idea.15 The Hearst 
Corporation informed 1,004 Americans in October and November of 1986 
that: 
The U.S. Constitution states that a special Constitutional Convention may be 
called to consider amending that document when two-thirds of the states 
request it. Do you think a Constitutional Convention should be assembled in 
1987, the bicentennial anniversary of the Constitution, to consider 
amendments dealing with contemporary issues such as prayer in public 
schools, abortion, freedom of the press, and other matters?16  
Quite astonishingly, 61% answered “yes” and only 34% said “no.”17 The 
question is certainly not a model of terse clarity, even assuming there were no 
other methodological problems with regard to assembling the sample.18 Again, 
it seems noteworthy (and perhaps curious) that only 5% did not offer a 
confident opinion one way or the other.19 Contrast this with a Roper Report in 
October 1985: after priming 1,998 respondents that some people feared a 
“runaway convention,” it found that 33% supported a new convention, 37% 
opposed it, and 30% did not know where they stood.20  
To be sure, all of these polls were taken more than a quarter-century ago, 
and it is possible that the level of overall public veneration of the Constitution 
has increased over that time. However, given the general discontent that many 
feel with the American political system—almost no one in 2015 is arguing that 
it is “morning in America,” in contrast with the famous theme of the highly 
successful re-election campaign of President Reagan in 198421—it would be 
interesting indeed if veneration has increased even as overall satisfaction with 
the system created by the Constitution has decreased. Or perhaps the 
contemporary polls are measuring the success of, say, those Tea Party activists 
                                                                                                                     
 15 Id. 
 16 THE HEARST CORP., THE AMERICAN PUBLIC’S KNOWLEDGE OF THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF PUBLIC AWARENESS AND PERSONAL OPINION 33, 
37 (1987).  
 17 Id.  
 18 Id. at 38.  
 19 Id. at 33, 37. 
 20 Roper Report No. 85-10, Question 90 (Oct. 1985) (poll data available at 
http://ropercenter.cornell.edu/ipoll-database, Dataset No. USRPRR1985-10). It is at least 
worth mentioning one earlier poll. On at least three occasions in the 1930s and 1940s, 
Roper and Fortune Magazine asked whether the Constitution “should be thoroughly 
revised to make it fit present day needs.” Five percent of respondents answering this 
question in December 1939 believed that “[t]he systems of private capitalism and 
democracy are breaking down and we might as well accept the fact that sooner or later we 
will have to have a new form of government.” See Roper/Fortune Survey, Question 1  
(Dec. 1939) (poll data available at http://ropercenter.cornell.edu/ipoll-database, Dataset No. 
USRFOR1939-013). 
 21 “Morning in America,” USHISTORY.ORG, http://www.ushistory.org/us/59a.asp 
[https://perma.cc/B5YK-PPJ6]. 
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who assert both that our polity is in a desperate state and that the answer to our 
problems is to return to honoring the 1787 Constitution as intended by the 
Framers.22 
But our topic in this Symposium is not the United States Constitution, but, 
rather, the fifty state constitutions.23 So perhaps we should begin by 
contemplating the 1991 survey cited by Alan Tarr indicating that “52 percent 
of respondents knew that their state had its own constitution, 11 percent 
believed that it did not, and 37 percent did not know or gave no answer.”24 
One can easily wonder, of course, how much information even those who 
knew of the existence of their own state’s constitution had about its specifics. 
Given the well-demonstrated ignorance of basic details of the U.S. 
Constitution,25 it would be astonishing if many citizens of Ohio, say, were 
familiar with the details of the 122-page Ohio Constitution26 conveniently 
made available to the attendants at the Symposium. Indeed, a common 
critique—fair or not—of state constitutions is that they are too long and too 
detailed,27 in contrast with what Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland 
described, admiringly, as the “great outline[]”28—with details presumably to 
be filled in later—drafted in Philadelphia and ratified in 1787–1788.29 It is 
worth noting, however, that the “great outline” approach stands as an 
exception to global trends in constitutionalism.30 In their study of 
constitutional epidemiology, Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James 
Melton find that more detailed national constitutions tend to last longer.31 
Moreover, an audacious recent article by Versteeg and Emily Zackin has noted 
that American state constitutions are in fact quite similar in length and detail to 
                                                                                                                     
 22 See, for example, the “constitutionalist” views expressed by someone like Glenn 
Beck, who published an edition of The Federalist “translated,” as it were, into twenty-first 
century English. GLENN BECK & JOSHUA CHARLES, THE ORIGINAL ARGUMENT: THE 
FEDERALISTS’ CASE FOR THE CONSTITUTION, ADAPTED FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, at xxxii 
(2011).  
 23 Jeffrey S. Sutton, Foreword, State Constitutions in the United States Federal 
System, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 195 (2016). 
 24 G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 2 n.4 (1998). 
 25 Press Release, Constitutional Ctr., National Survey: More Teens Can Name Three 
Stooges than Can Name Three Branches of Government (Sept. 2, 1998), http://constitution 
center.org/media/files/survey-1999-stooges.pdf [https://perma.cc/FY5V-QTWW].  
 26 See OHIO CONST. (available at http://www.ocmc.ohio.gov/ocmc/docs/Constitution.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FGV3-UZAQ]). 
 27 See TARR, supra note 24, at 9–11.  
 28 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
 29 See H.R. DOC. NO. 110-50, at vi (2007).  
 30 See Jose Luis Cordeiro, Constitutions Around the World: A View from Latin 
America 6–8 (Institute of Developing Economies, Discussion Paper No. 164, 2008), http:// 
www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Dp/pdf/164.pdf [https://perma.cc/2B3A-MA5U].  
 31 ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 86–88 
(2009). 
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most national constitutions elsewhere.32 Even if we grant the premise that the 
national constitution is “exceptional,” there is no reason to confuse that 
singular constitution with “American constitutionalism” more generally.  
Stephanopoulos and Versteeg determined that the overall level of approval 
of state constitutions was lower than that of its United States counterpart.33 
Still, they found that the “average approval score” of respondents’ own state 
constitution was 6.7 out of 10 and the median score 8.34 One might still regard 
this as quite impressive. Interestingly enough, the primary predictor of such 
approval was not knowledge of specifics or the congruence between one’s 
own constitutional vision and the actualities of the state constitution.35 Indeed, 
yet another essay by Versteeg has shown that constitutions may well reflect 
more the views of the political elites who drafted them than the preferences of 
the median citizen.36 In any event, what apparently explains approval—and 
perhaps even such “veneration” as might exist—is one’s overall pride 
(patriotism) regarding one’s own state.37 Proud Ohioans, or residents of any 
other state, are presumably likely to believe, without actually examining the 
evidence, that their state has a fine constitution.38 
Perhaps this level of support helps to explain what we believe to be an 
important and dismaying statistic: over the past twenty years no electorate in 
the country has demanded a new constitutional convention with regard to the 
state’s own constitution. There is good reason to expect otherwise. Fourteen 
states contain provisions by which their electorates can vote at stipulated 
intervals to have a new constitutional convention that would presumably 
assess the merits of the state constitution regarding present challenges and 
likely future problems in their constitutions.39 It appears that Oklahoma may 
not in fact have complied with its constitution in this regard since 1970, the 
last time the electorate was offered the opportunity to call a new convention,40 
                                                                                                                     
 32 Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited, 
81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641, 1705 (2014). 
 33 See Stephanopoulos & Versteeg, supra note 3, at 20. 
 34 Id.  
 35 Id. at 26–28. 
 36 Mila Versteeg, Unpopular Constitutionalism, 89 IND. L.J. 1133, 1174 (2014). 
 37 Stephanopoulos & Versteeg, supra note 3, at 28, 44. 
 38 See id. In fact, the statistical meaningfulness of this finding is dubious, at best. If 
we assume that most respondents do not have much knowledge of state constitutions, when 
asked how much they support their state constitution, their answer is likely to be influenced 
by how proud they are of their state. Thus, you have an independent variable pride being 
used to explain a dependent variable, which is an iteration of pride. 
 39 ALASKA CONST. art. XIII, § 3; CONN. CONST. art. XIII, § 3; FLA. CONST. art. XI, 
§ 4; HAW. CONST. art. XVII, § 2; ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; MD. CONST. art. XIV, § 2; 
MICH. CONST. art. XII, § 3; MO. CONST. art. XII, § 3(a); MONT. CONST. art. XIV, § 2; N.H. 
CONST. pt. 2, art. 100(c); N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 2; OHIO CONST. art. XVI, § 3; OKLA. 
CONST. art. XXIV, § 2; R.I. CONST. art. XIV, § 2; see also infra Table 1.  
 40 An advisory opinion issued by then-Attorney General G.T. Blankenship holds, 
“[t]he . . . requirement of Article XXIV, Section 2 of the Oklahoma Constitution is that a 
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but the other thirteen states have had elections on the constitutionally 
compelled calendar.41  
Levinson has written elsewhere of his admiration for these constitutions 
and his deep wish that the United States Constitution contained such a 
                                                                                                                     
law providing for a convention be submitted, to the people for their approval or rejection at 
least once every twenty years.” Okla. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 70-125 (1970). Because the 
convention referendum has been interpreted to require legislative action for its creation, the 
failure of the Oklahoma Legislature to pass such a law in 1990 and 2010 (or any time in 
between) explains the lack of subsequent referenda. Id. 
 41 See Constitutional Conventions on the Ballot: By Year, BALLOTPEDIA, https:// 
ballotpedia.org/Constitutional_conventions_on_the_ballot#tab=By_year [https://perma.cc/ 
52PU-53VD]; see also, e.g., State of Alaska 2012 General Election, November 6, 2012, 
Official Results, ALASKA DIVISION ELECTIONS (Nov. 28, 2012), 
http://www.elections.alaska.gov/results/12GENR/data/results.htm [https://perma.cc/KF6P-
C43B]; Conn. Sec’y of State, Statement of Vote, General Election, November 4, 2008,  
at 100–03 (Nov. 26, 2008), http://www.sots.ct.gov/sots/lib/sots/electionservices/ 
statementofvote_pdfs/2008_sov.pdf [https://perma.cc/9572-CR3J]; Revision and 
Amendment of the Hawaii State Constitution, HAWAII OFF. ELECTIONS, 
http://elections.hawaii.gov/resources/revision-and-amendment-of-the-hawaii-state-constitution/ 
[https://perma.cc/GV8S-2WWR]; Statewide Question Totals: General Election, 11/4/2008, 
ILL. BOARD ELECTIONS, http://www.elections.il.gov/electioninformation/ 
StateQTotals.aspx?id=22 [https://perma.cc/7H8U-33J3]; Iowa Secretary of State, Official 
Results Report: 2010 General Election held Tuesday, November 2nd 2010, at 6–10, 
https://sos.iowa.gov/elections/pdf/2010/ballotquestionsorr.pdf [https://perma.cc/QU9H-
W79U]; 2010 Michigan Election Results, MICH. SECR’Y ST., http://miboecfr.nictusa. 
com/election/results/10GEN/ [https://perma.cc/GU6Z-3KKZ] (last updated Dec. 9, 2015); 
Official 2010 Gubernatorial General Election Results for All State Questions, MD.  
BOARD ELECTIONS, http://www.elections.state.md.us/elections/2010/results/General/ 
gen_detail_qresults_2010_2_0001S-.html [https://perma.cc/P9FC-Q93K] [hereinafter 
Maryland 2010 Election Results]; DAVID C. VALENTINE, MO. LEGISLATIVE ACAD., 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, STATUTORY REVISION AND REFERENDA SUBMITTED TO 
THE VOTERS BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OR BY INITIATIVE PETITION, 1910–2010  
(Dec. 2010), https://web.archive.org/web/20140502223410/http://ipp.missouri.edu/files/ 
ipp/attachments/19-2010_constitutional_amendments.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8LQ-6EBM]; 
Mont. Sec’y of State, 1972–Present Historical Constitutional Initiatives and Constitutional 
Amendments, http://sos.mt.gov/Elections/forms/history/constitutionalmeasureslist2012.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FH4L-XN2Y] (last updated Feb. 26, 2013); Constitutional Amendment 
Questions—2012 General Election, N.H. SECRETARY ST., http://sos.nh.gov/ 
2012ConConGen.aspx [https://perma.cc/LA43-R2FA]; N.Y. Bd. of Elections, November 
4, 1997 General Election, Question Number, Constitutional Convention, http://www. 
elections.ny.gov/NYSBOE/elections/1997/quest1_97.pdf [https://perma.cc/ TLM6-4NZX]; 
State Issue 1: Constitutional Convention: November 6, 2012, OHIO SECRETARY ST., 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/Research/electResultsMain/2012Results/2012110
6Issue1.aspx [https://perma.cc/BQW2-UR9C] [hereinafter Ohio 2012 Election Results]; 
2014 General Election: Question 3 - Constitutional Convention, R.I. BOARD ELECTIONS, 
http://www.ri.gov/election/results/2014/general_election/ [https://perma.cc/KG5A-4U7X] 
(last updated Dec. 3, 2014). 
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provision.42 At the very least, even if one is not out-and-out proud of the fact 
(as demonstrated in John Dinan’s invaluable book The American State 
Constitutional Tradition) that there have been over 230 state constitutional 
conventions in our national history,43 it is an extremely interesting piece of 
empirical evidence about the actualities of American state constitutionalism. 
At one time, it was certainly possible to suggest that Americans, at least when 
identifying themselves as citizens of their home states, loved conventions, 
given the sheer numbers.44 To be sure, some states loved conventions more 
than other states: the flinty, independent citizens of New Hampshire lead the 
pack with seventeen such conventions.45 Interestingly enough, New 
Hampshire has never formally replaced its 1784 Constitution, though, of 
course, it has been amended aplenty.46 Maine apparently has never held a 
convention since drafting its original constitution in 1820.47 But, as one might 
expect in a polity where the fifty American states average nearly three 
constitutions each,48 most states have indeed experienced the reality of state 
constitutional conventions even after the initial constitution was up and 
running. 
But consider the record since 1997—when New York conducted its last 
every-twenty-years vote—within these thirteen states: each rejected the 
possibility of holding a new convention.49 However, Maryland’s rejection 
should receive an asterisk. A majority of voters in 2010 who cast ballots on the 
issue voted in favor of a new convention, but the Maryland Constitution has 
been interpreted as requiring a majority of those voting in the overall election 
rather than simply a majority of those who chose to vote on the convention 
itself.50 Too many Marylanders blanked their ballots regarding the convention 
to achieve what might be called the “constitutional majority.”51  
                                                                                                                     
 42 LEVINSON, supra note 10, at 12. This book is organized around the conceit that 
Americans had the option to vote for a national convention and suggests that they should 
vote “yes.”  
 43 JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 9 (2006). 
 44 Of the 233 state constitutional conventions held in American history, 144 occurred 
during the nineteenth century. See G. Alan Tarr, Popular Constitutionalism in State and 
Nation, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 237, 267 (2016). 
 45 DINAN, supra note 43, at 11. 
 46 Id. at 11–12. See generally N.H. CONST. 
 47 DINAN, supra note 43, at 295 n.9.  
 48 William Dawes Blake, Judicial Independence in the American States 106 (Aug. 
2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin) (on file with The 
University of Texas Library). 
 49 See supra note 41. 
 50 See Daniel Leaderman, Judge Nixes Question 7 Challenge, SOMDNEWS (Jan. 22, 
2013), http://www.somdnews.com/archive/news/judge-nixes-question-challenge/article_e2 
86f24d-847f-5cf0-8fc3-af3a143f5e10.html [https://perma.cc/64H8-DLKE] (describing a 
failed legal challenge of Maryland’s requirement that more than a simple majority of votes 
cast is needed to call a convention). This is not a self-evident interpretation of the relevant 
constitutional provision, which states that Marylanders must be given an opportunity every 
twenty years to vote on whether or not to have a new constitutional convention. MD. 
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Ohio is one of these thirteen states.52 It, too, is on a twenty-year cycle,53 
and in 2012, only 31.9% of the electorate (approximately 1.5 million voters) 
supported a new state convention.54 It is worth pointing out that this was the 
smallest such percentage of voters among the thirteen states.55 As one might 
imagine, Maryland achieved the highest percentage, with 48.1% of the overall 
electorate (according to their election rules) supporting a new convention, 
though 44.9% of Rhode Islanders in 2014 agreed that a new convention should 
be called; coming in third and fourth place, respectively, were the 41.5% of 
Montanans in 2010 and the 40.6% of the Connecticut electorate in 2012.56 
Other percentages ranged from the 37% of New Yorkers in 1997 to the 32.8% 
of Illinoisans in 2008,57 though that state requires a 60% approval rate to 
trigger a new constitutional convention.58 
II. ANALYZING STATE CONVENTION CALL REFERENDA 
So what should one make of these statistics? We might begin with the 
most basic question: are they reliable measures of an educated public opinion? 
Or is it possible, for example, that the response of voters depends to some 
significant extent on the precise phrasing of the question they are asked to vote 
upon? Similarly, even if it is possible that a vote accurately measures the 
distribution of public opinion on the day it is conducted, might there be 
significant differences in the turnout of voters—and, therefore, the public 
opinion registered in the votes—depending on when the election is held? Thus 
we proceed to examine whether support for state constitutional revisions varies 
based on who is asked, how the question is phrased, and how often these 
referenda appear on the ballot. We were able to find results of the most recent 
referenda in all fourteen states by searching the websites of the various 
secretaries of state. This data is displayed in Table 1. 
                                                                                                                     
CONST. art. XIV, § 2 (“[I]f a majority of voters at such election or elections shall vote for a 
Convention, the General Assembly, at its next session, shall provide by Law for the 
assembling of such convention, and for the election of Delegates thereto.”).  
 51 Maryland 2010 Election Results, supra note 41. 
 52 See supra notes 39, 41 and accompanying text.  
 53 OHIO CONST. art. XVI, § 3; see also Steven H. Steinglass, Constitutional Revision: 
Ohio Style, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 281, 297 (2016). 
 54 Ohio 2012 Election Results, supra note 41.  
 55 See infra Table 1. 
 56 See infra Table 1. 
 57 See infra Table 1. 
 58 ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 1. 
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Table 1: Summary of Convention Call Referenda 
State Most Recent 
Voting 
Yes Rolloff 
Specific 
Language 
Years 
Between 
Ballot 
Referral 
Alaska 2012 33.4% 10.6% No 10 
Connecticut 2008 40.6% 13.2% Yes 20 
Hawaii 2008 34.1% 4.9% No 10 
Illinois 2008 32.8% 17.8% Yes 20 
Iowa 2010 32.8% 14.7% No 10 
Maryland59 2010 48.1% 19.1% Yes 20 
Michigan 2010 33.4% 9.9% Yes 16 
Missouri 2002 34.5% 12.2% No 20 
Montana 2010 41.5% 7.5% Yes 20 
New Hampshire 2012 36.0% 15.7% No 10 
New York 1997 37.0% 40.3% No 20 
Ohio 2012 31.9% 14.5% Yes 20 
Oklahoma60 1970 23.7% - Yes 20 
Rhode Island 2014 44.9% 5.9% No 10 
 
Our theory is rather straightforward. If voters confront a ballot question 
that is ambiguous or otherwise problematic in its meaning, the fallback—or 
default—position is simply to maintain the status quo, which in this case 
would be resistance to the prospect of a new constitutional convention. One 
can do this by voting “no.” But it is also possible, and indeed likely, that many 
voters will simply choose to leave the ballot blank. Political scientists refer to 
the percentage of voters who skip a particular part of the ballot as rolloff.61 
While ballot rolloff tends to be high for all ballot measures,62 rolloff appears to 
be even higher on convention referenda. Two of the fourteen referenda listed 
in Table 1 were the only statewide referenda on the ballot that year. In nine of 
the remaining twelve elections, rolloff for the convention referenda was higher 
than the average rolloff for all other ballot questions at the same election. The 
average rolloff on the convention questions was 14%, while the average rolloff 
                                                                                                                     
 59 The percent yes votes displayed in Table 1 do not take into account requirements 
for double majorities that are present in Maryland. See supra note 50 and accompanying 
text. 
 60 The 1970 convention ballot measure in Oklahoma was conducted during a March 
special election and was the only item on the ballot. H.J.R. 1004, 32nd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. 
(Okla. 1970). To measure rolloff we used turnout statistics provided in state election results 
to form the baseline. As such, there is no way to calculate voter rolloff. 
 61 See, e.g., Lawrence Baum, Judicial Elections and Judicial Independence: The 
Voter’s Perspective, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 19 (2003).  
 62 Shauna Reilly & Sean Richey, Ballot Question Readability and Roll-Off: The 
Impact of Language Complexity, 64 POL. RES. Q. 59, 59 (2011). 
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for the other ballot measures in the same election was 12.6%, which is a 
statistically meaningful disparity.63 
We contend potential voters go through a two-stage process when 
confronting ballot questions such as calling a new constitutional convention. 
First, they have to decide whether they wish to cast a vote at all; only if that 
decision is affirmative must they go on to decide which option (yes or no) to 
select. Here we are interested in explaining two phenomena: voter rolloff and 
support for referenda designed to bring about a new convention. Regression 
analysis allows for a systematic statistical evaluation of relationships between 
variables. In statistical terms, rolloff and convention support serve as our 
dependent variables. We analyze whether support for these referenda varies 
across three independent variables: 
(1) Was the referendum in question on the ballot in a presidential election 
year or a so-called “off year,” when overall turnout is likely to be 
smaller and somewhat different in composition?64 
(2) Did the ballot proposal clearly explain what was being voted upon, as 
against leaving voters possibly confused as to what precisely they 
were being asked to support? 
(3) How often are such proposals on the ballot? That is, how many years 
elapse in different states before the Constitution requires that the 
question be resubmitted to the voters for their consideration?  
A. Referendum Timing: Presidential Elections Compared to Off Years 
Unsurprisingly, it is well established that voter turnout is higher in 
presidential election years, but what type of voters only come to the polls 
every four years, in contrast to more frequent voters?65 If there are no 
significant differences among these voter cohorts, then the distribution of 
views on relevant issues, in this case the desirability of a new convention, 
ought not to be different. However, according to the Pew Research Center, to 
assume lack of difference would be a mistake.66 Americans who vote 
intermittently are less likely to be knowledgeable about the candidates and less 
                                                                                                                     
 63 A difference of means t-test indicates that the disparity in rolloff between 
convention referenda and other referenda is statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level. 
THOMAS H. WONNACOTT & RONALD J. WONNACOTT, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS 291–97 
(5th ed. 1990).  
 64 See THOM FILE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WHO VOTES? CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 
AND THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE: 1978–2014, at 3 (July 2015), https://www.census.gov/ 
content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p20-577.pdf [https://perma.cc/GB3S-
GP9B]. 
 65 We assume very few voters in fact stay home during presidential years and come 
out only during the off years. See id. at 3–5.  
 66 See Who Votes, Who Doesn’t, and Why, PEW RESEARCH CTR.: U.S. PRESS & POL’Y  
(Oct. 18, 2006), http://www.people-press.org/2006/10/18/who-votes-who-doesnt-and-why 
[https://perma.cc/P24F-BUAQ].  
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interested in local politics than consistent voters.67 In other words, these voters 
who show up only once every four years are almost certainly less likely to 
realize that their state has a constitution, that its details might be quite 
important in explaining actual governmental behavior, or why a constitutional 
convention may be a good idea. Thus, because intermittent voters make up a 
larger percentage of the electorate in presidential election years, we 
hypothesize that support for convention calls will be lower than when these 
referenda are scheduled in off year elections. We also predict rolloff will be 
higher in presidential election years compared to off year elections.  
Six referenda on state constitutional conventions occurred during 
presidential election years, and the remaining seven occurred in off year 
elections, mostly during mid-term elections.68 On average, the ballot questions 
conducted in presidential years received 34.9% support, while an average of 
40.7% of voters supported these referenda in off year elections. Voter rolloff, 
somewhat surprisingly is lower during presidential years (12.7% on average) 
compared to off year elections (16.2% on average). However, before we 
confirm or reject our hypotheses, we must ask whether these differences across 
election years are meaningful or statistical anomalies? The regression analysis 
will answer these questions for us. 
B. Ballot Language: What Does the Ballot Ask Voters? 
Ballot language is the only information source that all voters are 
guaranteed to be exposed to. It is also the last piece of information voters will 
encounter before casting their ballot. In most states, elected officials are 
responsible for writing ballot language, creating an opportunity to advance 
their political agenda. Disputes over the fairness of ballot language often end 
up in court.69 Survey experiments in political science indicate the way a ballot 
question is worded can affect how citizens perceive the issue.70 Even when a 
ballot question is quite complicated, interest group endorsements greatly assist 
voters in identifying their position.71  
                                                                                                                     
 67 See id.  
 68 See supra Table 1. States holding referendum during presidential elections include 
Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, New Hampshire, and Ohio. States holding 
referendum in off years include Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New York, 
and Rhode Island. See supra Table 1. 
 69 See List of Ballot Measure Lawsuits in 2012, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/ 
List_of_ballot_measure_lawsuits_in_2012 [https://perma.cc/FSW9-VBD3]. 
 70 Craig M. Burnett & Vladimir Kogan, When Does Ballot Language Influence Voter 
Choices? Evidence from a Survey Experiment, 32 POL. COMM. 109, 109 (2015). 
 71 See generally Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and 
Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63 
(1994). 
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Frequently, constitutional convention referenda do not generate much 
interest group activity.72 The National Institute on Money in State Politics has 
tracked money raised for and against ballot initiatives since 2008. There were 
no issue committees formed to advocate for or against eight of the eleven 
convention referenda during that timeframe, and the other three did not 
generate significant spending either. Convention supporters in Connecticut, 
Illinois, and Michigan spent a combined $166,000 while convention opponents 
spent a combined $2.5 million.73 Even in an election environment with little to 
no campaign spending, ballot language still provides voters with useable 
information. A political science study of three different California ballot 
propositions revealed a large majority of voters learn at least one fact about a 
ballot measure from the ballot language itself.74 The study, based on an exit 
poll, also found no statistically significant difference in the amount of 
knowledge voters reported about a proposition that generated no campaign 
spending and a set of propositions on which proponents and opponents spent a 
combined $134 million.75  
Fortunately for our research agenda, it turns out that the questions on the 
various state ballots were worded in interestingly different ways. Some states 
use very specific language. For example, Connecticut voters confronted the 
following language at the polls in 2008: “Shall there be a Constitutional 
Convention to amend or revise the Constitution of the State?”76 Marylanders 
received even more detailed instructions and information in 2010:  
Should a constitutional convention be called for the purpose of changing the 
Maryland Constitution?  
Under Article XIV, Section 2 of the Maryland Constitution the General 
Assembly is required to ask the voters every 20 years whether a constitutional 
convention should be called for the purpose of altering the Maryland 
Constitution.77  
                                                                                                                     
 72 In 2010, when the question was on the ballot in Montana, Levinson was surprised 
to discover, while attending breakfast at a conference on the Constitution in Washington, 
D.C., sponsored by the very conservative Hillsdale College, that his table-mates, almost all 
from Montana, were seemingly unaware that they would shortly have the opportunity to 
vote yay or nay on a new convention in their home state.  
 73 Ballot Measures, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY ST. POL., http://www.follow 
themoney.org/our-data/ballot-measures/ [https://perma.cc/QQD6-NK9Y] (searching for 
Constitutional Convention as subject for each year from 2002–2014). 
 74 Craig M. Burnett, Does Campaign Spending Help Voters Learn About Ballot 
Measures?, 32 ELECTORAL STUD. 78, 88 (2013). 
 75 Id. at 87. 
 76 State of Conn. Official Ballot, Watertown, Conn., State Election (Nov. 4, 2008), 
http://www.watertownct.org/filestorage/3928/SAMPLE_BALLOT_FOR_08.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/265Q-6G6C]. 
 77 2010 General Election Ballot Questions, Statewide Questions, Question 1, 
Constitutional Question, Maryland Constitutional Convention, MD. BOARD ELECTIONS, 
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Ohio’s ballot language starts off somewhat vaguely, but eventually provides 
voters with specific information.78 The ballot measure quotes from Article 
XVI, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution, which contains the language, “Shall 
there be a convention to revise, alter, or amend the constitution.”79 However, 
the ballot language concludes, in large bold print, with different language, 
“Shall there be a convention to revise, alter, or amend the Ohio 
Constitution?”80 
By contrast, Rhode Islanders confronted the following ballot language in 
2014: “Shall there be a convention to amend or revise the Constitution?”81 All 
but the most knowledgeable voters could surely be forgiven if they were 
uncertain whether they were being asked to support a new national 
constitutional convention or instead a far more modest state convention. 
Ambiguous language, similar to this Rhode Island ballot measure, can be 
found on the ballots of seven of the thirteen states that conducted periodic 
convention calls as required by their state constitutions. On average, ballot 
questions with language that specifically mentions the call is for a state 
constitutional convention receive 36.1% support, while less clearly worded 
ballot questions receive on average 36.3% support. Rolloff when the ballot is 
worded specifically is 13.7% on average, compared to 14.9% when the ballot 
is nonspecific.  
Again, we hypothesize that when voters encounter a referendum whose 
language they do not understand, their preference becomes maintaining the 
status quo—either by voting “no” or by not voting on this question. This bias 
toward the status quo might be especially important for those voters who 
mistakenly believe that they are being asked to support a new national 
constitutional convention. Given the amount of worship our Founding Fathers 
receive in public school curricula and in modern political discourse,82 voting 
for a national constitutional convention may seem like the equivalent of voting 
no on apple pie, baseball, and Chevrolet all at once. 
C. How Often?: The Impact of Referenda Frequency 
We also examine whether the practice of voting on convention calls is 
more ingrained in some states than others. For over a century, political 
                                                                                                                     
http://www.elections.state.md.us/elections/2010/ballot_questions.html#state1 [https://perma.cc/ 
Z2BZ-CQHF]. 
 78 See Official General Election Ballot, Warren County, General Election, November 
6, 2012, http://www.voterfind.com/warrenoh/data/20121106G/0001%20%201X.pdf?6356 
42044113587989 [https://perma.cc/QLS5-R6VE] [hereinafter Ohio 2012 Ballot]. 
 79 See id; OHIO CONST. art. XVI, § 3. 
 80 Ohio 2012 Ballot, supra note 78 (emphasis added). 
 81 Official Election Ballot, State of Rhode Island, Town of East Greenwich, Tuesday, 
November 4, 2014 (emphasis added), http://www.eastgreenwichri.com/Portals/0/Uploads/ 
Documents/Board%20of%20Canvassers/2014SampleBallots/0901sample%20ballot.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3WAE-NHQL]. 
 82 See Stephanopoulos & Versteeg, supra note 3, at 1–2 and accompanying text. 
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scientists have hypothesized that direct democracy serves an educative 
function. Writing in 1912, Harvard political scientist William Munro observed, 
“[b]y means of the initiative, a spirit of legislative enterprise is promoted 
among the voters; men are encouraged to formulate political ideas of their own 
and to press these upon public attention.”83 More recently, empirical political 
science has supported this theory. Citizens in states with more frequent use of 
the initiative exhibit higher levels of internal efficacy; that is, they “are more 
likely to see themselves as having resources and skills that allow them to 
influence what government does.”84 Exposure to more initiatives on a single 
election ballot increases both political knowledge and interest in politics 
amongst voters.85  
Constitutional convention referenda appear on the ballots of these thirteen 
states at different frequencies. As Table 1 indicates, some states refer these 
questions to the ballot once every ten years, others, like Ohio, wait 20 years to 
have a new referendum.86 We predict that when the time between ballot 
referrals is lower, more voters will remember voting on a convention call the 
last time around. Greater familiarity with voting on constitutional conventions 
should reduce rolloff and increase support for the referenda. When a 
convention for a call appears on the ballot once every ten years, voter rolloff 
averages 10.4%, and voter support averages 36.5%.87 When the period 
between ballot referrals is greater than 10 years, voter rolloff averages 16.8%, 
and voter support averages 38.3%.88 
D. Analyzing the Data: Regression Analysis 
We test the strength of these statistical relationships between our three 
independent variables and two dependent variables through multivariate 
regression. To capture the two-stage nature of this decision-making process, 
we employ seemingly unrelated regression analysis.89 Table 2 presents the 
results of our models. The first two columns of Table 2 report which 
dependent variable is being tested in relation to a set of independent variables. 
                                                                                                                     
 83 WILLIAM BENNETT MUNRO, THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL 20–21 
(1912). 
 84 Shaun Bowler & Todd Donovan, Democracy, Institutions and Attitudes About 
Citizen Influence on Government, 32 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 371, 372 (2002). 
 85 See id. 
 86 States with ten years between referenda are Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, New Hampshire, 
and Rhode Island. States with twenty years between referenda are Connecticut, Illinois, 
Maryland, Missouri, Montana, New York, Ohio, and Oklahoma. Michigan is a bit of an 
odd duck, with referenda occurring every sixteen years. See supra Table 1. 
 87 See supra Table 1. 
 88 See supra Table 1. 
 89 This statistical technique allows for correlated error terms across the equations for 
each dependent variable. See generally Denzil G. Fiebig, Seemingly Unrelated Regression, 
in A COMPANION TO THEORETICAL ECONOMETRICS 101 (Badi H. Baltagi ed., 2001). 
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The remaining columns report the regression coefficient, standard error, and p-
value for each independent variable.  
Each model also contains an R2 statistic, which measures the percentage of 
the variation in the values of the dependent variable accounted for in the 
regression model. An R2 of zero means that the regression model does not 
explain any of the variability in the dependent variable. For example, a model 
with an R2 of zero would not provide any information as to why Ohio’s 
convention call received 31.9% compared to the 44.9% support in Rhode 
Island.90 An R2 of 1 indicates the model predicts perfectly; it fits every data 
point in the sample. Very high R2 scores almost never occur in social science 
research because human subjects are not nearly as predictable as, say, atomic 
particles. 
Table 2: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model of  
Convention Call Referenda 
DV IV β S.E. p 
Rolloff Presidential Election -0.039 0.036 0.267 
 Specific Language -0.116 0.048 0.016 
 Referral Interval 0.016 0.005 0.002 
 Constant -0.030 0.072 0.682 
Observations: 13, R2: 0.450 
Support Presidential Election -0.056 0.030 0.057 
 Specific Language 0.017 0.040 0.665 
 Referral Interval 0.001 0.004 0.801 
 Constant 0.381 0.060 0.001 
Observations: 13, R2: 0.261 
 
Regression coefficients allow for making predictions of how each 
independent variable affects the dependent variable. Specifically, the 
coefficient represents how much the dependent variable changes with a one-
unit change in an independent variable. For example, the coefficient for the 
Referral Interval in the Rolloff model is 0.016. This means that a one-year 
increase in the number of years between ballot referrals tends to increase the 
amount of voter rolloff by 1.6%.  
The standard error measures how far each regression coefficient in our 
sample is from the “true” population value. In other words, a standard error is 
helpful in assessing whether the relationship between an independent and 
dependent variable is accurate or simply a fluke generated by this sample. The 
likelihood that there is no real relationship between variables is represented by 
the p-value. Returning to the effect of Referral Interval on Rolloff, the p-value 
is 0.002. This means the probability that this coefficient is a false positive is 
only 0.002. Put differently, we can state with 99.8% confidence that we have 
                                                                                                                     
 90 See supra Table 1. 
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identified a statistically significant relationship between these two variables. It 
is scientific convention that only statistical relationships that have p-values < 
0.05 are considered statistically significant, although this assumption is 
frequently relaxed to p < 0.10.91 
The first dependent variable analyzed is the percentage of voters who did 
not cast a vote on a constitutional convention ballot question. The R2 score of 
0.450 indicates the model fits the data very well. Two of the three variables 
achieved conventional levels of statistical significance. Ballots that 
specifically mention a convention would amend the state constitution achieve 
rolloff rates 11.6% lower than states with unspecific ballot language. Why any 
secretary of state would not want voters to understand what they were 
considering in a ballot measure is astonishing. Our results suggest these 
omissions have meaningful consequences.  
As mentioned above, every additional year in-between ballot referrals 
increases rolloff by 1.6%, on average. Thus, the difference between states that 
schedule their ballot referrals every decade compared to once every twenty 
years is quite meaningful, as the former schedule tends to reduce rolloff by 
16%. It appears from our data that voters become conditioned to voting on 
constitutional conventions. When these questions appear on the ballot more 
frequently, more voters understand the issue well enough to cast a vote. 
The presidential election year variable did not achieve statistical 
significance; moreover, the coefficient was not in the predicted direction. In 
other words, our theory predicted higher levels of rolloff in presidential 
election years (because of the presumptive increase in less knowledgeable 
voters) which means we would expect the coefficient to be a positive number. 
Instead, the model produced a coefficient of -0.039, which suggests rolloff 
might be lower in presidential election years. However, the p-value of 0.267 
indicates we cannot state with enough confidence that rolloff is actually lower 
in presidential election years.  
The bottom portion of Table 2 displays the analysis of the second 
dependent variable, the percentage support for convention call referenda. The 
R2 of 0.261, while not as strong as the rolloff model, still indicates a good fit. 
Only the presidential election year variable achieved statistical significance 
and only at the p < 0.10 level. The results suggest voter support for convention 
calls is 5.6% lower in presidential election years. Perhaps those who turn out 
in presidential years feel more inclined to register their opinions, rather than 
leave ballot blank, but, when confronted with an issue about which they have 
no informed views, they vote “no.” 
Circling back to the Buckeye State, Ohioans vote on a convention call 
once every twenty years and always during a presidential election year.92 Had 
this question been scheduled in 2014 instead of 2010, the measure would 
likely have received 5.6% more support. While this extra support would not 
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 92 See supra Table 1. 
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push the referendum over the 50% line, it would have made the vote 
significantly closer. Also, if the Ohio Constitution placed a convention call on 
the ballot once every ten years, our model suggests voter rolloff would have 
been nearly eliminated.  
III. THE END OF THE AGE OF CONVENTIONS? 
In any event, the central question, once we determine the empirical data, is 
whether we should be pleased or dismayed that the age of conventions, even at 
the state level, has seemingly come to an end. Professor Tarr notes that the 
19th century saw 144 such conventions, and the 20th century another 64.93 
Fifteen years into the 21st century we have seen nary a one, and there are no 
apparent prospects for such a convention.94 However, the next scheduled vote 
will occur in New York in 2017, and that might be particularly interesting 
inasmuch as there is widespread discontent with the current New York system 
of government; moreover, since becoming independent of the United 
Kingdom, New York has had nine conventions and four constitutions.95 
Even in 1997, the incumbent Governor Mario Cuomo was one of many 
supporting the referendum that would have triggered a new convention.96 
                                                                                                                     
 93 Tarr, supra note 44, at 267. 
 94 It should be noted, though, that the American territory of American Samoa did hold 
a constitutional convention in 2010. Sarah Wheaton, An American Concept, Carried Out in 
Samoan Style, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/25/ 
us/25samoa.html [https://perma.cc/5EEZ-75X9]. Although the convention discussed the 
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Associated Press, Faleomavaega Wins 12th Election to Congress, KPUA (Nov. 4, 2010), 
http://www.kpua.net/news.php?id=21505 [https://perma.cc/QHV2-QUBX]. Many Samoans 
criticized election officials for bundling all thirty-four proposed amendments into a single 
question, rather than allowing voters to decide on an amendment-by-amendment basis. Id. 
By including controversial provisions alongside ones with broad public support, an “all-or-
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the entire package. Elmer E. Cornwell Jr. et al., State Constitutional Conventions: 
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opposed to constitutional change frequently use this to their advantage. For example, 
Rhode Island Republicans who strongly opposed the constitution that had been proposed 
by a convention that met from 1964–1968 fought to include a provision creating a state 
lottery. Id. at 106, 127. Opponents of the proposed amendments that resulted from New 
York’s 1967 constitutional convention included a provision lifting a ban on public funding 
of parochial schools, while the inclusion of strong racial nondiscrimination language was 
used to defeat the amendments proposed a 1967–68 convention in Maryland. Id. at 127–28. 
On the other hand, when the Connecticut, Hawaii, and Illinois presented controversial 
items on the ballot separately, the remainder of the proposed amendments from the 
conventions in those states passed. Jay S. Goodman et al., Public Responses to State 
Constitutional Revision, 17 AM. J. POL. SCI. 571, 573 tbl.1, 574 (1973). 
 95 DINAN, supra note 43, at 11. 
 96 See Richard Perez-Pena, Constitution Is Stealth Issue of 1997, Attracting Strong 
Feelings, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/27/nyregion/ 
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Consider a key paragraph in a 1997 story in The New York Times story on the 
coming referendum: 
Those who want a convention, including Mr. Cuomo, think the 
timing could not be better. With record late state budgets year after year, 
partisan polarization in state government and this year's bruising rent 
fight, there is a widespread sense that Albany is broken, and that a 
radical fix may be in order. Polls show that while most New Yorkers are 
not even aware that they will be voting on the matter in five weeks, when 
they are told of the choice, a great majority favor a convention.97 
What is striking is how much this paragraph resonates today. If Mario 
Cuomo’s son Andrew, the current New York governor, ends up supporting a 
new convention in 2017, then the paragraph could probably be republished 
without change! The proposal did not pass, in 1997,98 however, perhaps 
because “fear” of a convention triumphed over “hope” about what it might 
attain. Things did not get better, however, as illustrated by the title of a 2009 
article in The New York Times: “As Voter Disgust With Albany Rises, So Do 
Calls for a New Constitution.”99 Will 2017 bring about a new convention and, 
possibly, a revised New York constitution? One can already find a website 
“clearinghouse” of information on the upcoming vote, featuring a quotation 
from Governor Andrew Cuomo: “A new constitutional convention could be 
the vehicle for critical reforms to our State government.”100 It would not be 
surprising, therefore, if he advises an affirmative vote come 2017. Already, 
though, New York State United Teachers appears to be mobilizing opposition 
to any such convention, based on the premise that the consequences would 
potentially be quite radical.101 For what it’s worth, an article in a Long Island 
weekly referred in its title to the “fierce 2017 political storm” that is already 
“brewing” concerning the referendum.102 The author notes that the 1977 
referendum was vehemently opposed by political conservatives afraid of what 
liberals might do, whereas by 1997, “the strongest opponent was the AFL-
CIO, which worried that uncontrolled delegates might gut rights and 
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 98 See supra Table 1. 
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pensions.”103 This only underscores the point that actual constitutions are 
never written behind veils of ignorance. It is always the case that voters—and 
politicians deciding what positions to take—have their own surmises about 
potential winners and losers and decide accordingly.  
In any event, 2017 will present yet another test of the propositions 
underlying this paper. What will New York voters do, and why? One 
possibility is that reflective citizens will in fact decide that they support the 
current constitution without potential changes. Another, though, is opposition 
to a convention based on the fact that any constitutional change would have to 
go through the current public officials of New York State, the very persons 
who are the object of popular mistrust. Levinson has many times referred to 
what he has labeled “Roche’s dictum,” which he heard the late political 
scientist John P. Roche invoke at a meeting of the American Political Science 
Association in the 1960s: “Power corrupts but the prospect of losing power 
corrupts absolutely.”104 That is, if officials have gained their officers, and the 
prerogatives thereof, through the existing political system, why would one 
expect them to be open to the possibility of radical change? This speaks more 
to the futility of a convention, which would no doubt be very costly without 
producing any real change. This is precisely why it is crucial to have the 
possibility of a citizen-called (and, presumably, dominated) constitutional 
convention that offers an alternative to having to place a monopoly of 
decision-making authority in the hands of current office holders. But, of 
course, a third possibility that might explain a vote against a new convention is 
fear of those who might end up exercising power, however they are chosen.  
It might be worth mentioning in this context the Ohio Constitutional 
Modernization Commission established by the state legislature in 2011,105 
whose Senior Advisor, Steven Steinglass, was a valuable participant in the 
Symposium.106 One need not denigrate any member of the Commission in 
order to suggest that its composition is highly likely to be more representative 
of political elites, including, of course, current public officials, than would be 
the case if a popularly mandated convention had been called by the Ohio 
electorate in 2012.107 It certainly seems altogether likely that the establishment 
of the Commission in 2011 was viewed as a way of discouraging any popular 
movement that might organize itself around the 2012 referendum. The implicit 
message of the Commission, whatever it ends up recommending in 2021, a full 
ten years after its establishment, is that ordinary Ohioans need not concern 
themselves with the adequacy of their constitution. Whether this confidence in 
the Commission—and concern about the likely judgment of ordinary 
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Ohioans—is merited we leave up to those who know more about Ohio than we 
do.  
Much food for thought is provided by the voting record in New Hampshire 
over what is now five election cycles. That is, although the state once had such 
popular votes every seven years, the period between elections was increased to 
ten years by constitutional amendment in 1964 (an amendment itself the 
product of one of that state’s seventeen conventions over the decades).108 
There were, therefore, referenda in 1972 and every ten years after regarding 
calling a new convention, with the results summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3: New Hampshire Constitutional Convention Referenda 
Year Yes Vote (%) 
1972109 56.9 
1982110 52.3 
1992111 49.2 
2002112 49.1 
2012113 36.0 
 
Three things are immediately noticeable: First, as is obvious, the electorate 
in 1972 and 1982 voted for new conventions. Second, no convention has been 
held since 1982 because of rejection of that possibility by the electorate. But, 
third, the margins of the 1992 and 2002 elections are quite different from that 
of the 2012 vote. One might reasonably describe the two earlier votes as close 
to statistical ties; were they ordinary polls, they would come within the 
margins of error. Were a second poll taken (or election held) even shortly after 
the first one, there is at least a one-third probability that the result would be 
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different. That is surely not the case in 2012, when close to two-thirds of the 
electorate indicated a desire to preserve the status quo (or simply to leave any 
amendment in the hands of the legislature, as allowed also by the very 
important amendments proposed by the 1964 convention and then ratified by 
the people of New Hampshire). Again, one can wonder what explains this 
change. One possibility remains a markedly greater satisfaction by New 
Hampshirites in 2012 than in earlier years regarding their state constitutional. 
We confess to some doubt about this as a very robust explanation, though it 
must also be admitted that there is very little polling data, in any of the states, 
dealing with such questions.114  
We want to suggest another, more ominous, possibility, which is simply 
that even in New Hampshire, a state famous for the degree of citizen 
involvement in politics—just think of the New Hampshire presidential 
primaries115—there is increasing mistrust of one New Hampshirite by another. 
This might simply be linked to the generally increasing level of polarization in 
American politics;116 but it may also be a function of population growth in the 
Granite State. Thus, the 2010 population was approximately 1.32 million 
persons, as compared with 1.23 million in 2000,117 1.11 million in 1990,118 
and 921,000 in 1980.119 The absolute numbers are obviously not very high, 
but, as University of New Hampshire demographer Ken Johnson has noted: 
“New Hampshire has always benefited from a significant inflow of people 
coming to it.”120 What this may mean is that the number and percentage of 
relative “strangers” has been increasing and with it, during a period as well of 
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polarization, a greater unwillingness to trust constitutional reform to the 
potential “contamination” of these newcomers with their possibly alien ideas.  
Support of sorts is provided for this surmise by the response of listeners to 
a “Constitution Day” talk given by Levinson in Concord, New Hampshire, on 
September 17, 2015. A distinguished senior federal judge reminisced that forty 
years ago, when he was still active in New Hampshire politics before being 
appointed to the bench, he could genuinely believe that he knew “every” New 
Hampshire lawyer and major public official (or potential public official), 
regardless of political party. That provided the basis for a certain kind of 
political culture. It may be, however, a thing of the past because there are “too 
many people” to allow the kinds of relationships that once were typical of the 
state. And one measure of this change in culture, we want to suggest, perhaps 
as a basis for further research, is that the kind of civic trust necessary to accept 
a constitutional convention where “dire necessity” does not require one is 
evaporating. If that surmise has any purchase for New Hampshire, just 
imagine how much more likely it is to explain the views of voters in far larger 
states. From this perspective, perhaps what really cries out for explanation is 
the willingness of a full 48% of those who turned out for the Maryland 
election in 2010 to support a new convention in that state.121 
IV. CONCLUSION: ON “REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT” AND CANARIES IN 
COAL MINES 
Might one regard the diminishing frequency of state constitutional 
conventions as simply one more piece of evidence that the hope expressed by 
the U.S. Constitution regarding the maintenance of a “Republican Form of 
Government” is, in fact, illusory? This dour conclusion might follow if one 
regards as a prerequisite of civic republicanism the willingness of engaged 
voters to treat their state constitutions as truly serious documents requiring 
recurrent assessment and updating to allow them, as John Marshall put it so 
eloquently in McCulloch v. Maryland, to adapt “to the various crises of human 
affairs.”122 To be sure, the national Constitution, whatever its invocation of 
“Republican Form of Government” in Article IV, is almost stunningly hostile 
to the idea of actual participation in governance by the ordinary citizen.123 As 
Publius explains in The Federalist No. 63, the “true distinction” of the 
proposed constitutional order lies “‘in the total exclusion of the people in their 
collective capacity from any share’ in actual policy making, except insofar as 
representatives are attentive to public opinion.”124  
State constitutions, however, embrace a very different attitude towards 
mass political action. Among the fifty states, only Delaware emulates the 
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national Constitution in excluding the voters from both the initiative and 
referendum processes.125 The remaining forty-nine all acknowledge some role 
for direct democracy.126 This can range from the relatively minimal 
requirement, as in Texas, that the electorate approve any constitutional 
amendments proposed by the state legislature,127 to the maximalist system of 
California, where the voters can use the initiative and referendum even to 
amend the state constitution without any legislative participation.128 Ohio,129 
like Maine,130 very importantly allows the electorate to engage in what 
Levinson has termed “citizen review”131 (in contrast to “judicial review”), 
where legislation passed by the legislature and signed by the governor can 
nonetheless be overridden by a popular vote, as was done, of course, in 2011 
with regard to legislation affecting the rights of Ohio’s public employees.132 
One might use the outcome of the legislative-override referendum as evidence 
for the proposition that Ohio’s voters are fully capable of thinking for 
themselves, which makes it all the more interesting that they voted so 
overwhelmingly against a new state convention.133  
One might analyze such statistics as we have brought forth as evidence for 
the proposition that Ohioans, like most Americans across the country, it 
appears, indeed affirmatively like their state constitutions and see no reason to 
engage in a thorough examination of the kind one might expect in a 
constitutional convention. Perhaps at least mild support for this conclusion is 
provided by the material in the Stephanopoulos and Versteeg article.134 Such 
optimism, though, seems at least questionable if one thinks of the satisfaction 
with state constitutions measured by Stephanopoulos and Versteeg as a 
grade.135 The median score was an 8 out of 10136—a solid “B” in many 
gradebooks. And yet, in every recent convention referenda, at least 30% of 
voters thought their state constitution was failing so badly it needed an 
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opportunity for change.137 So why would one believe that the results in the 
thirteen states under examination indicate such a contented social order? One 
can look at a variety of other data detailing the decline in confidence in 
American governing institutions, where trust levels are even lower than for 
state and local institutions.138 Or, concomitantly, one might look at answers to 
the all-important general question about whether the country is moving in the 
right or wrong direction.139 We scarcely seem to be living in a new Era of 
Good Feelings full of trust in government and esteem for its leaders.  
Ohio serves as a proxy for the larger concern with the dearth of state 
constitutional conventions. What deterred another 20% of the Ohioans from 
joining the 31.9% who voted for a constitutional convention?140 One answer, 
as already indicated, is overall contentment with the constitutional status quo 
in the states. Another is the confidence that the Ohio Constitutional 
Modernization Commission will, in fact, produce, even if not until 2021, the 
kinds of improvements that are needed. We suggest, though, that another 
possibility is that most Americans no longer feel sufficient trust in their fellow 
citizens to trust them with the responsibility of engaging in what Publius, in 
Federalist 1, called “reflection and choice” about how we are to be 
governed.141 This opening essay of The Federalist captures the Enlightenment 
belief that government by, as well as simply for the people was genuinely 
possible.142 All of us were being asked to reflect about the adequacy of the 
government established by the Articles of Confederation—which, for the 
record, Publius regarded as an “imbecility”—and, therefore, the desirability of 
supplanting them with the new Constitution drafted in Philadelphia.143 
When it comes to state constitutional change, perhaps most Americans 
believe that the time for such conscious “reflection and choice” has passed. 
That was then and now is now, and most contemporary Americans may be 
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frightened to death of the capacity of their fellow citizens—especially if they 
increasingly tend to be viewed as possibly villainous Others—to engage in 
genuine “reflection” and, therefore, to make trustworthy “choices.” The 
creeping doubt and cynicism about public life is not just limited to governing 
institutions or individual political leaders. The American people appear to be 
losing faith in themselves. Figure 1 displays how survey respondents have 
answered a recurring Gallup question, and, from a democratic theory 
perspective, the trend is not positive. In 2015, when asked, “[H]ow much trust 
and confidence do you have in the American people as a whole when it comes 
to making judgments under our democratic system . . . ?” only 57% of 
respondents said they had a great deal or fair amount.144 In 2001, when Gallup 
asked this question for the first time, 74% of respondents indicated a great deal 
or fair amount of trust in the American people.145 What makes this earlier 
figure all the more impressive is that the poll was taken (just) before 
September 11.146  
Figure 1: Gallup Measure of “Trust and Confidence in the  
American People”147 
 
 
Thus when it comes to state constitutional change, better the devil we 
know than the potential devils we might get, as the saying goes. Especially if 
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we regard those doing the redesigning as devilish themselves. But the point is 
that this maxim condemns one to live in a “devilish” world because of the fear 
that things would be likely to get even worse if we attempted to engage in 
collective action to change the status quo. One might, of course, try to confine 
this discussion simply to the proposals for new constitutional conventions. But 
if the ultimate reason for the inability to achieve majority support is fear of 
what might happen, we wonder if this raises important questions for the health 
of our wider democratic political order. Perhaps we should view the 
convention referenda as the equivalent of the fabled “canary in the coal mine,” 
providing indications of the decreasing faith in the possibility of a flourishing 
democratic government.  
